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REGULATING WITH A CARROT:
EXPERIMENTING WITH INCENTIVES FOR CLEAN AIR*
INTRODUCTION
The Clean Air Act,1 like most traditional regulatory schemes,
was implemented by imposing specified standards, which require
specific technology, on certain categories of polluters. Traditional
regulatory systems which use penalties to induce compliance are
often called "command and control" regulation.2 Traditional regu-
lation is often blamed for hindering economic growth.3 However, in
1976 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated a
policy to accommodate economic development and the Act's goal
of eliminating health hazards posed by air pollution.4 The policy,
known as the "emission offset policy," was an attempt to use eco-
nomic incentives to induce compliance with regulatory aims.5 This
policy, revised in 1979, was advocated as an innovative model
mechanism for regulation. 6
The provisions of the emission offset policy "embody the
traditional 'carrot and stick' philosophy by creating incentives" for
* Funds for the interviews cited in this Comment were provided by the United States
Department of Education under the terms of the Public Service Education Program
(Institutional Grant and Fellowship Program) Higher Education Act of 1965, P.L. 89-329,
Grant No. USGOO-8002643/SUNYFR15O-2445A. The interviews were conducted as
research in preparation for a case study of the Air Quality Technical Assistance
Demonstration Project, in Buffalo, New York.
1. The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). Originally the 1967 Air
Quality Act, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 107(g), 81 Stat. 485 (1967) was referred to as the Clean
Air Act after the 1970 amendments, Pub. L., No. 91-604, § 109(b)(1), 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 101-19, 91 Stat. 685 (1977),
recodified the entire statute at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-42 (Supp. IV 1980) [hereinafter cited as
the Act].
2. See, e.g., Drayton, Smarter Regulation, 6 EPA J. 6 (Feb. 1980); Schultze, The Public
Use of Private Interest, 254 HAPPER'S, May 1977, at 43; Tucker, Marketing Pollution, 262
HARPER'S, May 1981, at 31.
3. Id. at 33, 36.
4. For a statement of the accomodation goal, see the Emission Offset Interpretative
Ruling, 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524 (1976).
5. Drayton, Getting Smarter About Regulation, HARv. Bus. REV. July-Aug. 1981, at 38,
46.
6. See, e.g., the former EPA Administrator in Costle, Current Developments, 9 ENV'T
REP. (BNA) 1708-09 (Jan. 12, 1979). See also Drayton, supra note 5, at 38.
194 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31
pollution reduction.7 In effect, incentives are created by establish-
ing a price on the right to pollute.8 Theoretically, a relatively high
price will be set on pollution rights by the trading of a limited
amount of rights among polluters. Monetary incentives will moti-
vate polluters to clean up efficiently and voluntarily rather than
pay the higher cost of purchasing a right to pollute.' Polluters fac-
ing a high cost of abatement may, in effect, pay another polluter
who can abate emissions at a lower cost. Some economists and ad-
vocates of incentive-based regulation argue that this approach is
more effective,10 efficient,"' and equitable'12 than traditional gov-
ernmental regulation." An experiment with incentives, this policy
could be expected to use voluntary, less costly compliance to ac-
complish the regulatory aims of reducing health hazards.
In practice the benefits of trading pollution rights have not
reached these expectations. While on its face the policy permits
economic development, the provisions are still an impediment to
7. New England Legal Foundation v. Costle, 475 F. Supp. 425, 437 (1979).
8. See Comment, Who Owns the Air? The Emission Offset Concept and Its Implica-
tions, 9 ENVT'L L. 575, 593 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Who Owns the Air?]; Comment,
Increment Allocation Under Prevention of Significant Deterioration: How to Decide Who
Is Allowed to Pollute, 74 Nw. U.L. Rav. 936, 949 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Increment
Allocation].
9. J. Hoffman, How to Reduce the Costs of Achieving and Maintaining Air Quality
Standards in Metropolitan Areas 5-7 (available from Office of Planning and Evaluation, En-
vironmental Protection Agency). See also Comment, The Tradeoff Policy: Solution to Di-
lemma of the Clean Air Act?, 1 HMAv. ENwv'L L. REV. 352, 375 (1976).
10. In policy analysis use, "effectiveness" of a policy refers to its success in achieving its
goal.
11. In policy analysis terms, "efficiency" refers to the cost of implementing a policy.
"Efficiency," for the purpose of this Comment, is limited to the administrative cost of the
emission offset policy. Economically efficient reduction is a goal of this policy. Thus it is
addressed under "effectiveness."
12. In policy analysis use, "equity" is the fairness of the distribution of benefits and
costs of a policy among the intended targets of regulation.
13. See, e.g., Calvo y Gonzalez, Markets In Air: Problems and Prospects of Controlled
Trading, 5 HARv. ENwv'L L. Rav. 377 (1981); Costle, supra note 6; Drayton, supra note 5;
Hoffman, supra note 9; Increment Allocation, supra note 8, at 948. Note that EPA has not
termed the right to an offset as "property."
Calvo y Gonzalez examines several potential models of regulation and concludes that a
mixed regulatory and proprietary system is desirable. He views the policy as a step in the
progression from a "commons" ownership of the air to public ownership, and, with this
policy, to private ownership. Whatever the nature of the rights created, the focus of this
Comment is whether the experiment has demonstrated thus far that private market forces
can be used to successfully supplement traditional regulation.
REGULATING WITH INCENTIVES
industrial expansion, especially in older, industrialized cities.1'
Further, few banking operations have been established. Without
active trading, markets have not set prices high enough to stimu-
late pollution reduction.1 5 Like the hierarchical structure of tradi-
tional regulation, the offset trading theory was developed on a fed-
eral level and implemented by state and local governments. As a
result; differing priorities developed and remain unresolved, while
the controls on trading have become loopholes.' 6
These failures are significant in evaluating the emission offset
policy as an experiment with incentive-based regulation. The flaws
in this experimental policy might be argued to be a result of inher-
ent faults in incentive-based regulation. Alternatively, fine-tuning
the provisions implementing this policy might be the solution. Af-
ter examining the development of the policy in Sections I and II of
this Comment, the policy's effectiveness, efficiency, and equity are
critiqued in Section III. The conclusions drawn are: 1) The policy's
failures result from implementation flaws which are not necessarily
inherent in the concept of incentive-based regulation; and 2) Ad-
justments in the implementation of the policy could result in more
effective incentives through active markets. Examining this model
of incentive-based regulation provides important insights into the
difficulties of creating market-based regulation. EPA is seeking to
expand the applications of the concept.' 7 While expanding the con-
cept, EPA could also modify trading controls to promote the nec-
essary markets in offset rights. Only active, controlled trading can
realize the policy's theoretical potential of effective, efficient, and
equitable attainment of the statutory goal of clean, healthful air.' 8
I. EVOLUTION OF REGULATORY INCENTIVES FOR CLEAN AIR
The Clean Air Act established National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) for major pollutants and divided the nation
14. 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3282 (1979) codified at 40 C.F.R. § 51 app. S (1980) (the emis-
sions offset policy). See also infra text accompanying notes 116-37.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 165-204.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 138-68.
17. Conversation with Michael Levin, Head of EPA's Regulatory Reform Staff (Sept.
1981) [hereinafter cited as Levin Conversation]. According to Mr. Levin, various expansions
of controlled trading are being considered, from generic bubbles requiring only state ap-
proval to using offsets to "net out" of review. See also N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1982, at 7, col. 1.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (Supp. IV 1980).
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into 247 Air Quality Control Regions (AQCRs) for monitoring and
control.19 Where air pollution in a region exceeded NAAQS, states
were required to develop State Implementation Plans (SIPs) for
attaining the required pollutant level (NAAQS).2 0 Failure to meet
these standards by an established deadline would result in a ban
on construction of all new pollutant sources in the region.21 Since
the purpose of the Act was to protect the public from dangerous
levels of pollution, NAAQS were based on air quality levels consis-
tent with health requirements rather than levels technologically or
economically feasible.2 2 The intent was to "force" the state of the
art of pollution abatement.23
By the mid-1970's it was apparent that the standards would
not be attained by the statutory deadline in many of the industri-
ally-developed AQCRs of the nation. The resulting regulatory ban
on construction of new pollution sources would freeze economic
growth in these regions. EPA recognized this was a politically un-
acceptable price for clean air.24 Therefore, in December, 1976 EPA
promulgated an interpretive ruling to accommodate economic de-
19. Id. at 7409. NAAQS established an allowable level of pollution in ambient air for
each criteria pollutant. Originally five, the list now includes ozone, carbon monoxide, sulfur
dioxide, total suspended particulates, hydrocarbons, nitrogen dioxide, and lead. Each AQCR
is a region within a state which must attain the NAAQS.
20. Id. at 7410.
21. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 110 (a) (2) (A) (i), 84
Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (a) (2) (A) (i) (Supp. IV 1980); 40 C.F.R. §
51.18 (b) (1973)). "Source" refers to a smokestack or other point of pollution production.
See infra note 33; S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1970); Union Electric Co. v.
EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257 (1976). These regulations are prime examples of imposing regulation
on the states through federal "conditions" on grants. The states "voluntarily" assume re-
sponsibility rather than give up federal funding and local control in other areas. See infra
note 163.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (Supp. IV 1980). "Primary" NAAQS are health related. Secondary
NAAQS were also established to protect public "welfare," which is generally taken to mean
plants, animals, and aesthetics.
23. See Bonine, The Evolution of Technology Forcing in the Clean Air Act, [July]
ENv'T REP. (BNA) No. 21 (July 25, 1975); Comment, supra note 9, at 357. "Technology
forcing" refers to an intent to stimulate development of more effective pollution abatement
equipment and processes. In theory, by requiring both attainment of standards below pre-
sent technological possibility and the best available control technology, a market is guaran-
teed for improved equipment and processes. This standard is different than tort liability's
traditional standards of "state of the art."
24. Raffle, Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Nonattainment Under the
Clean Air Act-A Comprehensive Review, [May] ENv'T REP. (BNA) No. 27, at 3 (May 4,
1979).
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velopment in non-attainment regions.25 Referred to as the "emis-
sion offset policy," this ruling permitted construction of a new pol-
lution source under limited conditions.2
In theory, the policy permitted new development in non-at-
tainment areas by allowing new, but not greater, pollution. The
policy required emissions to be "offset" by a reduction of emissions
from an existing source. The new emissions were required to be
less than the offsetting reduction, thereby resulting in a net benefit
of reasonable further progress toward NAAQS. To qualify as an
offset under this early policy version, a reduction by an existing
source had to be in response to a planned trade. The elimination of
a source for other reasons could be used as an offset only if the
new source was clearly a replacement for the eliminated opera-
tion.28 Therefore, a company closing a plant for economic reasons
was prevented from gaining "offset windfalls" for reductions unre-
lated to air quality.29 Furthermore, EPA believed that the use of
past reductions would be inconsistent with Clean Air Act policies.30
According to EPA, saving ("banking") reductions for future use
would create accounting problems, be of no environmental benefit,
and tend to dilute the benefits of the emission offset policy.
3 1
By 1977 Congress recognized the need to encourage economic
development and modified its goal of abating pollution at all cost.
32
The 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act codified the emission
offset ruling of 1976, "except as may be modified by rule of the
Administrator."33 In 1979 EPA revised the policy to allow the
25. 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524 (1976) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 51 app. S (1980)).
26. 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3284 (1979) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 51 app. S (1980)). The condi-
tions included limiting emissions to the lowest achievable rate and offsetting unpreventable
emissions with reductions from existing sources. The "net benefit" requirement was left to
reasonable determination on a trade by trade basis.
27. Id.
28. 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524, 55,529 (1976) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 51 app. S (1980)).
29. Raffle, supra note 24, at 16.
30. 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524, 55,526 (1976) (preamble).
31. 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3280 (1979) (preamble).
32. Note, Emission-Offset Banking: Accommodating Industrial Growth With Air Qual-
ity Standards, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 937, 944 (1980).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(n) (Supp. IV 1980). Congress changed the baseline for offset deter-
minations. The offset policy applies only to "major" new or modified sources. Disputes have
occurred as to the definitions of "modified" and "major." At present the only sources sub-
ject to the conditions of the offset policy are "major" sources-those with residual emissions
of 100 tons (for most pollutants) after application of pollution control equipment. 45 Fed.
Reg. 52,676, 688-89, 742 (1980) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 51 app. S). For a brief review of
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banking of reductions beyond those mandated by the applicable
SIP. 4 In effect, any reduction which met the conditions could be
used as an offset regardless of motivation for the emission
curtailment.
35
EPA's reversal on banking of reductions for future use was a
result of arguments for an incentive-based policy.36 Without bank-
ing, it was argued, industries would continue operation of margi-
nal, poorly controlled sources until an offset was needed for a
trade. Offset trading was believed to have been hindered by the
expenses of locating potential reductions and negotiating the con-
current reduction and new construction.3 7 A bank system would
the evolution of the definition of "major" source, see Calvo y Gonzalez, supra note 13, at
399 n. 129. See Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 352-55 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Note,
Alabama Power v. Costle, 10 ENWv'L L. 585 (1980) (for a detailed review).
Also, note that the emission offset policy applies to non-attainment areas, while related
policies apply to attainment regions. The present analysis of incentive-based regulation fo-
cuses on the offset and banking provisions applicable to non-attainment. As the clean air
policy has evolved, a variety of relevant changes have occurred. New sources in attainment
areas may be subject to regulations designed to Prevent Significant Deterioration (PSD), as
well as New Source Performance Standards (NSPS). The offset concept gave rise to a spi-
noff in the "bubble," a method of allowing companies to tradeoff reductions between sources
within an existing plant. Emissions standards must be met by the net of emissions from the
bubble. Specific sources to be controlled are determined by the company which, in theory,
allows standards to be met at lower cost. The bubble does not require trades to result in
"reasonable further progress," and, therefore, would not contribute to clean up in health
hazard areas. See Note, The EPA's Bubble Concept After Alabama Power, 32 STAN. L. REy.
943, 971 (1980). See also Calvo y Gonzalez, supra note 13 (for a review of offsets, banking
and bubbles, as well as their relation with PSD and NSPS); Emission-Offset Banking, supra
note 32 (for a contemporary overview of the offset policy). The concerns of attainment and
non-attainment areas are distinguishable, especially with regard to urgency of action and
the accommodation of economic development. Many proposals for modification of EPA's
controls of offset trading, bubble, and PSD increments would blur these distinctions. Id. at
408. To examine the policy experiment with a market-based incentives approach, it is most
appropriate to focus on banking and offset trading envisioned as a "future" style market.
The manifestations of a market approach include the viability of external trades and of
banking and trading structures. See infra text accompanying notes 53-88.
34. 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3285 (1979) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 51 app. S (1980)).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 3280; See also Raffle, supra note 24, at 16.
37. Id. at 17. Controversy over banking and use of past reductions reflects a basic dif-
ference between "command and control" and incentive advocates. EPA's careful terminol-
ogy and explanation for its reversal resulted from arguments within and without EPA.
"Command" strategists believe detailed supervision of polluters is necessary to eliminate
pollution hazards. Incentive advocates would use monetary rewards to induce, rather than
penalties to compel. EPA, under its new administrator, moved to supplement traditional
regulation with a market concept. See infra note 41. In this experiment, EPA was careful
not to acknowledge creation of rights to pollute, terming the rights "offsets" and "emission
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provide incentives to close a marginal plant as soon as feasible be-
cause the offset could be preserved. 8 Banking of past reduction
credit would ensure that offsets would be available when needed
by a new source.
The 1979 revision was an innovative attempt to supplement
traditional regulation with an incentive-based policy.3 9 The objec-
tive of the initial policy statement in 1976 was to allow limited de-
velopment in non-attainment regions where net reductions would
result through offsets. The 1979 reversal on banking was an at-
tempt to stimulate active trading and "markets" in offsets which
would set a high price, in effect, on the right to pollute. The intent
of the revised policy included the use of price incentives to pro-
mote voluntary pollution reduction. Another aim was a significant
savings in pollution reduction costs as a result of monetary rewards
for inexpensive reductions. Finally, the policy was designed to re-
move barriers to technological innovation.'0 Key EPA administra-
tors favored market-based incentive approaches and believed "fu-
tures" style markets could be created for offset trading. 1
Frustrated with the failure of traditional "command and control"
regulation which dictated specific reductions for each source,'
2
EPA revised the emission offset policy and promoted market ex-
perimentation with a grant program.'3
reduction credits." A right to pollute was unacceptable both politically and to traditional
EPA staffers. See supra notes 9 & 13.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 230-33.
39. See J. Hoffman, Economic Advantages of Emissions Banking Systems (May 1980)
(available from Office of Planning and Evaluation, Environmental Protection Agency).
40. Liroff, Foreward to R. Lmorr, Am POLLUrION OFFSETS: TRADING, SELLING, AND
BANKING (1980) (prepared for the Conservation Foundation).
41. See, e.g., Costle, Current Developments, 9 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1708-09 (Jan. 12,
1979). Costle, a former EPA Administrator, cites EPA's policies as "leading the way on rules
reform," by establishing that a right to use the air has a direct economic value which will be
set by buying and selling the rights on a "futures" market for air pollution rights. Id. See
also Drayton, supra notes 2 & 5 (Drayton is a former Assistant Administrator, EPA); Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, Emission Offset Banking and Trading Update (Feb. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as Update]. Hoffman, supra note 9 (Hoffman is a former Project Manager,
Emissions Offsets Banking and Trading Project); Hoffman, supra note 39. Note the differ-
ence between a "storage" bank or information system listing potential offsets, and the active
banking-brokerage system envisioned by these policy-makers. The intent was to create a
market for offsets which would produce economic incentives by way of prices. This has not
been successful. See Calvo y Gonzalez, supra note 13, at 401. The storage vault concept,
however, has been moderately used to accommodate development.
42. See Drayton, supra note 2.
43. 44 Fed. Reg. 3274 (1979). The Air Quality Technical Assistance Demonstration
1982] 199
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To justify this supplementation of the traditional regulatory
framework, EPA cited the 1977 Amendments for authority for its
reversal of policy on banking." The concept of saving reductions
for future use was said to be within the intent of the "growth mar-
gin" provision of the Amendments." This provision allowed states
to create "surplus" reductions below the NAAQS by requiring a
more strict state standard. The amount between the state and fed-
eral standards could be allocated by the states to economic devel-
opment. EPA interpreted this growth margin approach as allowing,
in principle, the "saving" of reductions for future use. EPA based
banking on this inferred intent to allow savings of reductions.46
Under the Clean Air Act, approved SIPs, which establish state
regulations to ensure compliance with NAAQS, were to supersede
federal policy by June 30, 1979.47 On that date new construction
would be banned in non-attainment areas which were not covered
by a federally approved SIP. When it became clear that SIPs
would not be developed and approved by the deadline, EPA again
devised a means to avoid imposing a ban. EPA conditionally ap-
proved SIPs, continuing the effect of the federal regulation in the
(AQTAD) project was funded by the EPA and four other federal agencies to test innovative
regulation; a $500,000, two-year grant to Erie County and Buffalo, New York, funded exper-
imentation with offset trading and the establishment of a bank. See Air Quality Technical
Assistance Demonstration Program, Grant Proposal of County of Erie and City of Buffalo
(Dec. 1, 1978) (available from Erie County Department of Environment and Planning)
[hereinafter cited as AQTAD Proposal]. Seven other urban areas received funding to test
experimental air pollution regulation. One of three categories of problems to be addressed
was the development of supplements to "traditional 'command and control' regulations."
Kurtzweg & Griffin, Economic Development and Air Quality: Complementary Goals for
Local Governments, 31 J. Am PoLturoN CONTROL, Nov. 1981, at 1155-57. The grantees
proposed to demonstrate methods that would achieve reductions beyond emissions limits.
Economic efficiency of regulation was to be improved. Seven of the eight were to test offsets,
and six were to test banking. Id. A key question in AQTAD was whether economic incen-
tives could replace or supplement regulation. National League of Cities & National Associa-
tion of Counties, Parallel Goals: Clean Air and Economic Development 10 (Mar. 1980)
(available from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency).
44. 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3280 (1979).
45. Id.
46. This rationale may stretch the congressional intention explicit in the growth margin
provision. Congress appeared to have adopted two means of accomodating economic devel-
opment, the EPA offset policy and the growth margin approach, while EPA sought to estab-
lish an incentive-based policy. See Note, supra note 32, at 944-46; 42 U.S.C. § 7503(1)(B)
(Supp. IV 1980).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (a) (2) (I) (Supp. IV 1980); 44 Fed. Reg. 32,471 (1979); 42 U.S.C. §
7502 n. (Supp. III 1979).
200 [Vol. 31
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gaps in partially completed state plans.48 However, even as ap-
proved SIPs supersede federal policy, the offset policy will have
continuing effect because regulations require SIPs to incorporate
mechanisms to accommodate economic development. Many states
have adopted the federal offset and banking policy in their SIPs to
meet this requirement. 49 Also, EPA has developed extensive infor-
mation for states on the operation of banks and offset markets.5 0
Further, EPA is considering expansions of the offset concept by
applying similar trade-off requirements to other programs. 1
II. ECONomic THEORY OF OFFSETS AND BANKING
A. Incentives.
After 1979 the purposes of the emission offsets and banking
policy were to accommodate economic development and to provide
an incentive structure for emission reduction.5 2 In 1976, the origi-
nal policy was promulgated to allow economic development under
the command and control implementation strategy of the Clean
Air Act.5 3 With the revision of the policy in 1979, EPA added an
economic incentive approach to promote less costly reductions,
technological innovations, voluntary reductions, and administra-
tive efficiency."
The key feature of the envisioned market in offsets would be
to set a price on the right to pollute in non-attainment areas.55
Economic growth would be allowed through marketing of limited
pollution rights. With each trade, the net reduction requirement
48. LIMR, supra note 40, at 40-41.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 7503 (1) (Supp. IV 1980). States adopt the offset policy due to restric-
tions in the Act and because alternatives are limited. States may adopt the offset policy, the
growth margin approach, or an original program meeting the Act's requirements. Id. at §
7503 (1) (B); LIROFF, supra note 40, at 36, 38. Twenty-eight states presently have offset
provisions in their SIPs, and between twelve and seventeen have banking provisions. Levin
Conversation, supra note 17.
50. See, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency, The Controlled Trader (July 1981)
[hereinafter cited as Controlled Trader]; Update, supra note 41.
51. Levin Conversation, supra note 17 (revolving funds, generic rules, and "netting-
out"). See also N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1982, at 7, col. 1.
52. Costle, supra note 41; Drayton, supra note 4, at 39, 44-45; Hoffman, supra note 9,
at 5; Update, supra note 41.
53. 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524 (1976).
54. 44 Fed. Reg. 3274 (1979); See also LmotF, supra note 40; Hoffman, supra note 39;
Update, supra note 41.
55. Costle, supra note 6.
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would ensure cleaner air, even though new sources of pollution
would be created. Market forces would stimulate clean-up activi-
ties and allocate the responsibility for reductions.5 6 The market
was envisioned as a controlled system based on certification of
trades, a limited supply of offset rights, and forced demand. Thus
the objective of the policy was to establish controlled trading with
a restricted supply of pollution rights to ensure the primary goal of
clean, healthful ambient air.5s
Under the policy, offset prices would be set by trading in a
market. In theory the price would be based on the relative cost of
the right to pollute the air and the equipment costs of avoiding
such pollution." By using a market function to set prices, the pol-
icy was not intended to force accountability for external costs. The
costs of pollution borne by those outside the pollutant source were
not to be determinative of the price of the right to pollute. 0
Rather, the advantages of using a market price to allocate the right
56. Clean-up would be less expensive due to savings on information costs as well as use
of least cost reducers (LCRs). The profit motive would provide incentive for voluntary re-
duction and technology innovation. See Calvo y Gonzalez, supra note 13, at 382; Drayton,
supra note 5, at 39.
57. The policy's requirement that new sources obtain an offset would ensure the de-
mand for pollution rights. Conditions on which reductions qualify as offsets would limit the
supply of these offsets. 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3284 (1979).
58. The air quality problem has been referred to as a "problem of the commons." Tuck-
er, supra note 2, at 31; Who Owns the Air?, supra note 8, at 589. Companies' costs of pro-
duction do not consider the "external" costs of using resources which are owned in "com-
mon." Free use is inevitably abused. Id.
59. A polluter could either purchase a permit or install additional equipment. Theoreti-
cally, the aggregate of these decisions would result in an optimal level at which the price of
all new reductions (i.e., equipment cost) is the same. The price of any new offset, generally,
would be the same as the cost of any new reduction. At that level, allocation is "efficient"
because no benefit can be obtained by a trade without a greater loss to one of the parties.
EPA intended the optimal price to be relatively high. EPA could influence price by control-
ling supply. Allowing offset credit only for reductions which are a result of equipment instal-
lation or process change would operate to limit the supply of offsets to only those with an
abatement cost. See generally Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON., 1 (1960);
Comment, supra note 9, at 375 n.113.
60. An "external cost" is the value of the use of resources (or damage to resources)
outside those which are incurred as production costs. Other incentive approaches have been
suggested that would force polluters to pay the external costs of pollution. Generally, it is
believed that if polluting companies are taxed an amount equivalent to the costs of the
pollution to society, they will find methods to prevent most pollution. See, e.g., W. BAUMEL
& W. OATEs, ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND THE QUALrrY OF LIFE, 246-53 (1979);
Tucker, supra note 2, at 32.
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to pollute included more cost effective emission reductions." Re-
ductions would always be made at the least expense because pol-
luters facing a high cost reduction would buy an offset from a
lower cost reducer. This would result in efficient allocation of the
nation's resources.6 2
The administration of pollution control was expected to be
less costly under the emission offset policy because information on
possible reductions would be less expensive. Unlike the command
and control system, information would be gathered by those with
the greatest access and control over the polluting processes. Indus-
trial managers would be motivated by monetary reward to identify
potential least cost reductions. The mechanism to provide these
benefits was to be the price on air use.63
A basic assumption underlying the incentive approach of the
policy is that all pollution cannot be eliminated because of unac-
ceptable economic and political results." However, rather than a
ban on new pollution sources and specific control of tolerated pol-
luters, EPA decided that limited rights to pollute would be allo-
cated by the market system. The marketable supply of pollution
rights (offsets) would be limited by policy conditions establishing
which reductions could qualify for offset trades.6 5 Limited supply
(and forced demand) would result in prices high enough to be in-
centives and ensure a relatively healthy level of air quality
(NAAQS). The initial allocation of rights would be limited to ex-
isting sources.66 Demand would be forced by the Act's required at-
61. See infra text accompanyng notes 71-75. See also Calvo y Gonzalez supra note 13,
at 386-87.
62. Id. See also supra note 59.
63. See infra text accompanying notes 225-32; Who Owns the Air?, supra note 8, at
575-76. The legal nature of the right is unresolved. One commentator suggested that it
should be treated analogously to broadcast licenses. See Note, supra note 32, at 960. An-
other possible analogy is the transferable development rights concept. See, e.g. Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y. 2d 324, 366 N.E. 2d 1271, 1277, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914
(1977).
64. See Tucker, supra note 2, at 32. Examples are relocation of industry from dirty air
regions, price inflation due to the expense of absolute emission control costs, and industry
failures as a result of inability to control emissions or inability to sell products at resulting
costs. See Who Owns the Air?, supra note 9, at 593. See also Increment Allocation, supra
note 8, at 955 (the right to pollute is of doubtful political popularity).
65. 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3284 (1979).
66. Under SIPs, regulated sources must make specified reductions to attain NAAQS.
Additional reductions could be used or sold as trade-offs for new sources. The net reduction
would be retired. Major new sources must reduce their emissions to the lowest achievable
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tainment of NAAQS and the policy's required use of offsets for
new pollution sources. Control of the market was intended to en-




Under the market concept, potential polluters have a choice of
reducing emissions or obtaining a right to pollute.68 Reduction re-
quires new processes or abatement equipment. Rights may be ob-
tained from existing polluters, who have banked an emission re-
duction or plan a future reduction. 9 A source must permanently
reduce its level of emissions to sell its right to a new source. The
net reduction of emissions would be retired from the market.70
The offset price is set by the parties. In theory, the price range
would be between the cost of the reducer's (seller's) abatement and
the purchaser's potential cost of abatement equipment to prevent
its emissions.1 It is assumed each polluter will hold his rights until
the offset price is greater than his costs of emission abatement.
2 If
rate and purchase offsets for new emissions. Id. See also supra note 221 and accompanying
text. The Clean Air Act allowed an alternative approach to allocation. This "growth margin"
provision allowed states to place a greater burden on existing sources to produce a margin
between federal and state standards which could be allocated to new sources. 42 U.S.C. §
7503(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1980). See Increment Allocation, supra note 8, at 936 (for discussion
of analogous allocation systems suggested by one commentator).
67. See infra text accompanying notes 85-89.
68. For new sources, the choice is limited under the policy because they must install
equipment to attain the Lowest Achievable Emissions Reduction. They must obtain, in ef-
fect, a right for emissions beyond control of present technology. 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3284
(1979). In theory, this should force offset demand and stimulate technological innovation if
the offset price becomes relatively high. See Drayton, supra note 2; Drayton, supra note 5.
The policy is a mixed system of "command and control" and incentive-based regulation.
Recently a commentator reviewed three hypothetical systems: exclusively incentive, exclu-
sively command and control, and a mixed system. The commentator concluded that EPA's
current mixed system is the optimal mechanism. See Calvo y Gonzalez, supra note 13.
69. The policy conditions require the reduction to be verifiable as well as enforceable,
and to set geographic limits. 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3283-84 (1979).
70. Id.
71. In theory, the seller would not reduce emissions for less than the cost of the neces-
sary equipment, and the purchaser would not spend more on an offset than the cost of
reducing its own emissions. See, e.g., F. ANDERSON, A. KNEESE, P. REED, R. STEVENSON & S.
TAYLOR, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVE (1977); BAUMEL &
OATES, supra note 60; Coase, supra note 59; R. STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND POLICY 340 (2d ed. 1978).
72. Id. Note that the cost of equipment is assumed to include installation and mainte-
nance costs. Of course, a polluter may decide to close down rather than purchase offsets or
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the price of an offset is more than the cost of abatement, the ra-
tional profit-motivated decision would be to abate emissions and
sell an offset.7 3 Theoretically, trading would continue until each
polluter's cost of an additional reduction would equal the cost of
an additional offset right. Prices would reach this equilibrium be-
cause each polluter would reduce pollution by purchasing abate-
ment equipment until the next (marginal) reduction would be
equally as costly as purchasing the right to emit pollutants. Limit-
ing the amount of offsets through control of the supply of pollution
rights would ensure that the equilibrium price would be relatively
high, stimulating voluntary reductions. 4 The allocation of rights
would be economically efficient when no source could benefit from
a trade without greater cost to another source. 5
The results of this process would be beneficial to health, gov-
ernment administration, and the reducers. Under traditional regu-
lation, each regulated source must reduce its emissions by a speci-
fied percentage regardless of cost.76 The offset and banking policy
would permit the actual reductions to be made by the sources that
could reduce emissions at the lowest cost. Many sources would be
able to reduce their costs by paying such a "least cost reducer"
(LCR) to reduce emissions in their place. 7 Therefore, industry
reduces expenses because EPA's requirements are met at the least
possible cost. The least capital is thus spent for each reduction
equipment.
73. Economic theory assumes that polluters are rational and will be motivated to re-
duce pollution by profit potential.
74. The use of the air generally has been free, so equipment has been more costly. To
reduce pollution significantly, a high equilibrium price is necessary in order to stimulate
equipment purchase rather than use of the air. See supra note 58.
75. Allocationally efficient. See supra notes 59 & 71.
76. The amount depends on the actual pollution in the ambient air and the SIP re-
quirements specifying reductions at each controlled source. These requirements are called
specification standards, because they specify the amount and method of reduction for each
source.
77. A Least Cost Reducer (LCR) is a polluter that can reduce emissions less expen-
sively than any other polluter. See, e.g., Calvo y Gonzalez, supra note 13, at 386. Traditional
regulation could establish performance standards, i.e., set a level of pollution reduction, and
require sources to attain the standards. It is doubtful, however, that any reduction would
occur without specification of the individual polluters responsible for the reductions. The
government theoretically could name the polluters which are the LCRs and require reduc-
tions from them. The necessary information, however, would be expensive and the LCRs
would be reluctant to produce this information. See id. at 388.
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within a region. Industry meets EPA's requirements at least cost
per company, and society gets cleaner air with less capital cost."
This regulatory structure would allow profit for LCRs, which
would be incentive for voluntary reductions and technology inno-
vation. In the long run, the incentive to improve abatement tech-
nology may result in greater pollution reduction at less cost.80 In
the short run, new technology which enables less costly reduction
may result in both a profitable offset trade and a competitive ad-
vantage in the market place.81 Under traditional regulations
NAAQS were said to be technology "forcing" because improved
abatement equipment was required to obtain specific pollution
levels. 2 Under this policy, incentives for equipment innovation
might be best termed technology "persuading" because develop-
ment is induced by profit motivation.8
Achieving the goal of healthy air with this market approach
would depend on a supply of offsets that is limited relative to the
demand. This would result in an offset/equipment equilibrium
price sufficiently high to stimulate emission reduction. LCRs would
have incentive to provide offsets which would facilitate trading.
84
Technological innovation would be induced, with long-term results
of greater reductions. To establish a high equilibrium price, the
78. Note that this is a result of the change from specification to performance standards.
Id. The Act, in a sense, assumes that the larger polluters are the LCRs and places the bur-
den on them (possibly due to a "best cost spreader" or "deep pockets" assumption).
79. See Drayton, supra note 5; Tucker, supra note 2.
80. Drayton, supra note 2, at 7; Drayton, supra note 4, at 39; Hoffman, supra note 9.
81. The market theory rests on assumptions of a free market. Monopolies or oligopolies
in the supply and demand for offsets may vary the effectiveness of the policy. See, e.g.,
Calvo y Gonzalez, supra note 13, at 396.
82. See supra note 23; 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3284 (1979).
83. See Drayton, supra note 4, at 39; Hoffman, supra note 9, at 5. Some commentators
believe that the offset policy may dilute the motivation for technological innovation. While
fewer sources must install new technology under the offset policy, the motivation to develop
more effective and efficient methods is nevertheless stronger. Under the Clean Air Act,
equipment that could reduce emissions was required regardless of cost and polluters had
disincentives to develop new reduction methods. Thus, whether called technology forcing or
persuading, the stimulus to innovate is more effective under the offset policy, because equip-
ment may be used where it will reduce the polluter's cost of compliance. While reductions
can also be made by process changes, the elimination of some of the disincentive (the policy
still requires equipment that will provide the lowest achievable emission rate) and the addi-
tion of profit-motivated innovation by other sources appear to increase motivation for inno-
vation. See Calvo y Gonzalez, supra note 13, at 421-24.
84. Hoffman, supra note 9, at 4. Readily available, publicized offsets at a known price
will facilitate trading. See Hoffman, supra note 31.
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availability of offsets must be limited in a controlled trading sys-
tem. 5 Historically, the use of air by polluters was free and seem-
ingly unlimited. Limiting and setting a high price on permitted use
would induce development of alternatives to the use of the air."'
Policy provisions which limit the reductions that qualify as offsets
would shift the supply, resulting in a higher price. The relatively
high price set by the resulting equilibrium of permit-equipment
purchases would contribute to the goal of clean air.8 7 The effective-
ness of the controls on trading, especially the requirements speci-
fying which reductions qualify as offsets, would be vital to the pur-
pose of providing incentives for attainment of a health related
standard.8
III. ANALYsis OF CONTROLLED TRADING8 9
A. Overview.
Commentators have anticipated problems with the uncer-
tainty in the proposed market system, especially with the legal na-
ture of the "right to pollute."90 The failure to establish active mar-
kets has been recognized recently.91 Proponents of the theory of
incentive-based regulation have concluded that despite such fail-
ings, EPA should expand controlled trading. However, the policy's
utility as an innovative model for incentive-based regulation has
85. See Drayton, supra note 2, at 7; Drayton, supra note 4, at 46.
86. See Tucker, supra note 2.
87. A relatively unlimited supply may actually dilute the effect of the Act. This possi-
bility, however, was foreseen by EPA. See 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3280 (1979).
88. Drayton, supra note 2, at 7; Hoffman, supra note 9, at 5-7. Calvo y Gonzalez seems
to perceive the basic purpose of this policy. See Calvo y Gonzalez, supra note 13, at 423.
The Gonzalez article is perplexing, however, in that it identifies the failures of the market
approach experiment, but proposes various new applications without addressing corrective
measures to stimulate trading. Id. at 380, 401, 418-30.
89. "Controlled trading" is a generic term applied for convenience to policies allowing
trade-offs in -emission reductions. See Drayton, supra note 5, at 38. While the term may
include bubbles and PSD increment policies, the analysis of the incentive regulation experi-
ment will focus on offset trading and banking in non-attainment areas. The emission offset
ruling of 1979 was an attempt to establish viable markets in offsets. The analysis of some
generally overlooked problems, such as the state of the economy, the government's role in
effectuation of the policy, and uncontrolled supply of offsets, will consider controlled trading
in its original context. See Costle, supra note 6; Drayton, supra note 2, at 7, 40. See also
Calvo y Gonzalez, supra note 13 (for a more comprehensive overview of alternative
applications).
90. See supra note 63.
91. See supra note 88.
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not been examined in relation to EPA's loosening of offset condi-
tions, the effects of regional economic conditions, and problems in
intergovernmental relations. Even EPA, in first issuing the policy,
expressed fears that allowing reductions to be credited as offsets
regardless of motivation would dilute the effect of the emission off-
set policy. 2 Yet in 1979 EPA reversed its position on banking and
now allows the use of offsets regardless of motivations.93 Wide lati-
tude in the definition of reductions qualifying as offsets may sat-
isfy local priorities of economic growth, but dilute the effect of
market incentives.9 4 Experience with the policy has not proven
that the benefits of market incentives are attainable.9 5
Currently twenty-eight states include an offset policy in their
SIPs, and between twelve and seventeen provide authorization for
banking. Active banks operate in only Seattle, San Francisco, and
Louisville." Recently a federal grant program testing innovative
regulatory programs concluded that a market structure based on
banking was impractical in an older, industrially declining North-
east city.97 According to the findings, stagnating industrial areas
could not generate sufficient demand for offsets to support an ac-
tive bank and market structure.9 8
92. 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3280 (1979).
93. Id. Critics have argued that the refusal to allow banking would result in polluters
maintaining old, dirty plants until a trade could be arranged. See Note, supra note 32, at
943. This argument seems to inflate the significance of a potential offset credit to industrial
planning, especially where a plant is otherwise producing below a marginal return. Further,
it was argued that banking and a broad definition of reductions qualifying as offsets would
facilitate trading. See Office of Planning and Management, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Offset Planning and Management, EPA, Emission Reduction Banking Manual 13
(Sept. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Banking Manual].
94. See supra text accompanying notes 84-88.
95. See, e.g., Calvo y Gonzalez, supra note 13, at 380, 401.
96. Levin Conversation, supra note 17.
97. Air Quality Technical Demonstration Assistance Project, Erie County, New York,
Technical Progress Report, Fifth Quarter 14 (Sept. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Technical
Progress Report]; A.D. Little, Inc., Report # 23 (1980) (available from the Erie County De-
partment of Environment and Planning).
98. The project director of the Air Quality Technical Assistance Demonstration Project
(AQTAD) for Buffalo and Erie County concluded that few major sources of pollution could
be expected to seek, expand, or locate in the region. As a result, a general referral system
was thought to be practical, while a brokerage bank was "relatively useless" because few
local trades could be expected. Id. The directors believe that a boom area like Houston
might support the banking concept. The trading concept was embraced by the local Indus-
trial Development Agency and the outcomes of the grant have largely assisted local indus-
try. These results reflect the local priority on development and the accomodation goal. In-
terview with Rosalind Parswell, former AQTAD Project Director (July 1981); Interview with
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While there are varied estimates of trades occurring under the
policy, only a small percentage have been trades between polluters
(external trades).99 Offsets within plants (internal trades) ac-
counted for up to ninety-five percent of an estimated 700 trades in
1978-79.10 Internal trades are not as effective in setting a publi-
cally recognized offset price.101 According to the economic theory
behind the offset and banking policy, active trading between pol-
luters is necessary to realize the benefits of the. incentive ap-
proach.102 Effective trading of offsets requires an active market to
supply price information and stimulate offset availability.103 The
information is necessary to determine the least cost reducer.0
Confidence in marketability of offsets is necessary to stimulate vol-
untary clean up and to provide technology persuading effect. 105
Banking was envisioned as a mechanism to supply informaton on
price, availability, and marketing of offsets.106
Offset trading is actively used to accommodate development,
but banking has not yet proven viable.107 However, EPA is consid-
ering several expansions of the concept. For example, offsets could
be used to satisfy reductions required of existing plants.108 Also, a
state revolving fund could be established to buy and retire reduc-
Charles Rosenow, Erie County Industrial Development Agency (July 1981); Interview with
Michael Raab, AQTAD Project Director (July 1981) [hereinafter cited as AQTAD Inter-
views]. See also supra note 41 (for the storage bank-brokerage distinction).
99. See Calvo y Gonzalez, supra note 13, at 401 n.147; Drayton, supra note 5, at 44. See
also Update, supra note 41, at 4-8 (regions reporting external trades show none in N.Y. or
New England, and only 15 nationally).
100. See Drayton, supra note 5, at 44, 46.
101. External trading is necessary to foster competitive bidding which will drive up the
price of offsets. Further, internal trades offer no publicly known price which establishes the
market value of potential offsets or inspires confidence that offsets are marketable. An inter-
nal trade may reflect a "price" choice between costs of abatement at two sources within a
plant. The function of a market, however, is to publicly establish prices and stimulate least
cost reductions across companies. See Drayton, supra note 2, at 40; Drayton, supra note 5,
at 44, 46.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 71-75.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 71-83. See also Drayton, supra note 5, at 44,
46.
104. Id.
105. The key feature of the system is industry recognition of potential profit, or cost
savings, from offset trading. Id.
106. See Costle, supra note 6.
107. See supra note 99.
108. Existing plants that are required by the SIP to reduce emissions could, in effect,
substitute a reduction by another source for this requirement. Levin Conversation, supra
note 17.
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tions to offset emissions due to industrial expansion. 10 9 Expansion
and modification of the policy may merely accommodate more eco-
nomic growth. However, an adjustment of the controls on trading
to activate the market may be required to secure the benefits of
incentive-based regulation. In view of inactive trading and bank-
ing, an observation of a former assistant administrator of EPA is
haunting: "If states or EPA allows these reforms to become loop-
holes, controlled trading will collapse instantly."110 In considering
policy modifications, the problem of banking's impracticality for
the economically declining cities of the Northeast should be ad-
dressed.1 ' To determine whether proposed changes will activate
markets or aggravate the problems, analysis of the market failure
is necessary. While some vital problems have been examined,11 2 the
effects of regional economic conditions and mixed governmental
priorities have not been considered.11
3
B. Effectiveness: Factors Undercutting the Market
The goal of the original emission offset policy was to accom-
modate economic development while achieving health related stan-
dards of air quality.11' After the 1979 revision the policy was aimed
at voluntary and efficient emission reduction through the use of
109. This is a device proposed for use where a company seeking to construct a new
source cannot locate an available offset. Rather than delay construction, the industry would
pay an assumed price for an offset to the fund. The fund, in turn, would purchase and retire
the first available offset. Id. Problems may arise regarding the local government's ability to
act as effectively as private industry in locating and negotiating offset transactions. Further,
an offset may be unavailable at the industry's offered price. In any case, information costs
will be shifted to local government. Without active trading, the initial price paid to the fund
will only be an estimate. Local government may not be effective in this role. See infra text
accompanying notes 165-213.
110. Drayton, supra note 5, at 46.
111. See supra note 97. Note that established industrialized areas were the target of
the original accommodation policy. See Davis, Kurtock, Leope & Magill, Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977: Away from Technology Forcing?, 2 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 1, 39 (1977).
112. Several commentators, for example, have analyzed the uncertainty of the nature
and security of the "right to pollute." The problems are resolvable with federal controls of
the definition of an offset. See Note, supra note 32, at 947. EPA appears to favor treating
offsets as marketable permits. The expansions under consideration would generally allow
trades with a permit change, rather than a SIP revision. Levin Conversation, supra note 17.
113. See infra text accompanying notes 123-37 (economic conditions may make a bank
useless and local priorities may prevent banking operations).
114. 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524 (1976).
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markets in offset rights. " 5 The incentive theory depends on com-
plex control of a market where price is sufficient to motivate volun-
tary reductions by least cost reducers.116 In practice, active trading
among industrial polluters has been sluggish, especially in the
Northeast.117 Offset prices are rarely publicly set and are undercut
by inexpensive reductions qualifying as offsets. "
1. Economic stagnation. The original offset policy was aimed
particularly at accommodating development in urban, industrial-
ized areas."19 EPA's goal in promoting the offset and banking ap-
proach was to establish viable markets in offset trading.1 20 Only an
active market would establish the price of offsets at a cost-of-pre-
vention, cost-of-permit balance. A relatively high price was desired
to motivate voluntary reductions and persuade industry to develop
innovative technology. These effects were unlikely where few buy-
ers of offsets were believed to exist. Without a perceived demand
for offsets, even least cost reducers would not likely generate a sat-
isfactory return on investment in abatement technology.1 2 1 There-
fore, offset marketability would undercut the market system.
1 22
In fact, participants in an EPA sponsored test of banking con-
cluded that in most traditional industrial areas of the Northeast,
banking was impractical because there was little demand for off-
sets.2 3 Local officials concluded that a bank was undesirable be-
cause industrial development was stagnant. Even though banking
costs would be paid by federal funds, local administrators of the
project decided that an offsets market structure was not worth the
effort.124 Houston was the type of developing area which was cited
as potentially able to support the concept.125 Economic stagnation
precludes a successful bank and therefore, undercuts the effective-
115. See Drayton, supra note 5, at 39, 44, 46.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 84-88.
117. See Drayton, supra note 5, at 44, 48; Technical Progress Report, supra note 97;
Update, supra note 41, at 4-8.
118. See infra text accompanying notes 147-65.
119. See Davis, supra note 111.
120. See Drayton, supra note 2, at 40; Drayton, supra note 5, at 39; Hoffman, supra
note 9; at 5-7.
121. See Liroff, supra note 40, at 42-45.
122. See Hoffman, supra note 9, at 5.
123. See AQTAD Proposal, supra note 43; Technical Progress Report, supra note 97.
124. Little future demand is expected because industry is leaving the region and new
economic development is projected to be of a low polluting nature. Id.
125. See Technical Progress Report, supra note 97.
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ness of the emissions and offset policy. 126
The effect of this finding is especially significant because with-
out an active bank, local government may suffer a competitive dis-
advantage in economic development. 127 Areas with active banks
may attract development because of reduced costs of identifying
offsets, no delays in coordinating offsets and new constructon, and
less costly offsets provided by least cost reducers. 2 " Even if an
area without apparent demand successfully developed a function-
ing market, the administrative cost per trade would still be higher
than in a more active market. 2 9 In theory, an area might induce a
market to attract industry with low-priced offsets. In actively de-
veloping areas, offset prices would be expected to rise as demand
exceeded supply. Industry might then seek to locate where readily
available, lower priced offsets were banked. This hypothetical sce-
nario relies on two faulty assumptions. First, it assumes a limited
supply of offsets in developing areas, which is not the case under
current policy. Second, it assumes local government has sufficient
confidence in the practicality of the policy to attempt to induce a
market. EPA's funded AQTAD experiment suggests that local gov-
ernment is unlikely either to perceive the likelihood of future ben-
efit of the policy or to believe industry location decisions will be
based on available offset prices.130
While AQTAD indicates that declining cities are unlikely to
develop banks, a basic referral service is still valuable. 11 Even in
industrially declining areas, identification of potential offsets is
126. The advantages of incentive regulation, i.e., least cost reductions, voluntary reduc-
tions, and technology persuading, are unlikely to be realized under current policy. Accom-
modation of industrial development is somewhat more successful. While new large industry
is unlikely, existing industry may expand or modernize operations. Offsets may be needed
for internal trades, but will not be sufficient to support a bank. See LiRoFF, supra note 40,
at 43; See also supra note 41 (for the distinction between storage and active banking).
127. Industry may be less likely to locate in areas where offsets are not readily availa-
ble, because planning would be uncertain and delays likely. Alexander, A Simpler Path to a
Cleaner Environment, 103 FORTUNE, May 4, 1981, at 234, 242-43; Drayton, supra note 5, at
44, 46.
128. LIROFF, supra note 40, at 43-44, 60-61.
129. Id.
130. AQTAD personnel saw the policy as highly complex, theoretical, and impractical.
AQTAD Interviews, supra note 98. See also Kurtzweg, supra note 43, at 1156-57 (all partici-
pants decreased their funds allocated to offsets and shifted the monies to more valuable
aspects of their projects).
131. AQTAD Interviews, supra note 98.
212 [Vol. 31
REGULATING WITH INCENTIVES
practical.132 An industrial development agency may wish to iden-
tify offsets to reduce barriers to expansion of existing industry.
Similarly, a major industry may occasionally consider locating in
the region, and an industrial development agency may wish to have
offset referrals available. Interest in accommodating such potential
development supports the establishment of an offset referral mech-
anism.13 3 Nevertheless, the policy of requiring offsets is viewed as
an impediment to development.13 '
The effectiveness of the policy in economically stagnating ar-
eas is marginal. While offset referrals may assist the accommoda-
tion of development, little benefit is realized from the incentives
approach. Even where the banking operation is "free," controlled
trading excites little interest.13 5
2. The offset supply: limited rights.138 The supply of offsets
is limited under a controlled trading system by the criteria for re-
ductions qualifying as offsets. Under controlled trading the func-
tion of a private market will provide monetary incentives through
the price level of offsets. A limited supply of offsets will result in
competitive bidding, which will raise the price to an optimal level
of prevention/permission. 3 7 This price serves the goals of accom-
modating economic development while stimulating clean-up efforts
through incentives.13 8 However, a large supply of inexpensive off-
sets results in lower prices, which are less of an incentive for tech-
nology development and voluntary emission reduction. Further,
the supply must be limited to ensure the desired level of abate-
ment is achieved by the cumulative effect of the individual firms'




135. Id. See also Calvo y Gonzalez, supra note 13, at 401 n.147. However, the switch to
flexible compliance with performance standards is significant. Internal trades do save costs
over specified reductions for each stack. LCRs, at least in a plant, reduce costs and thus the
incentive to litigate and delay. See Tucker, supra note 2, at 36. Internal trades, however, do
not result in LCRs across industries or have a significant impact on the market function.
The effect is like a "bubble," but with some net reduction after the offset.
136. The seemingly unlimited supply of free air use had caused the original market
failure resulting in air pollution hazards. See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 2; Who Owns the
Air?, supra note 8, at 589.
137. See supra text accompanying note 5.
138. See Drayton, supra note 2, at 7; Hoffman, supra note 9, at 5-7.
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refusal to allow banking under the 1976 policy.1 ' Defining the con-
ditions for an offset credit too broadly not only reduces the incen-
tives' effect, but could result in more polluted ambient air.140
If a source reduces emissions because it is going out of busi-
ness, its reduction is eligible under current regulations for an offset
trade.14 1 For example, an offset based on a prior reduction, unre-
lated to the purposes of the policy, was upheld in federal court.
142
Permission to construct a refinery on the Virginia coast was
granted based on offsetting hydrocarbon reductions by the state.
The State of Virginia agreed to continue converting to cheaper
emulsion-based asphalt rather than using petroleum-based asphalt.
The court held that although the state would have decreased hy-
drocarbon emissions by switching its type of asphalt for economic
reasons, a net enforceable reduction was the result of the trade.
The decision was a technically correct application of the EPA reg-
ulations. However, those challenging the offset argued that the re-
duction would have occurred without the trade and it should not
be certified as an offset.1 43 The air would have been cleaner, and
the trade did not stimulate any reduction or technological innova-
tion. While development was accommodated, the trade did not
provide cleaner air or incentives.1 44 Enforceability of the reduction
under the agreement added a distinguishing element, but the ques-
tion remains whether such offsets are desirable in view of the goals
of the Clean Air Act.
145
While trading regulations only require aki offset to be enforce-
able net emission reduction, allowing new emissions in place of this
kind of reduction seems anomalous with the Act and its dead-
lines.1 46 Greater reduction would have occurred voluntarily without
139. 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3280 (1979).
140. See infra text accompanying notes 149-52.
141. 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3280 (1979) (if the reduction is verifiable, enforceable, and
meets the other conditions for an offset).
142. Citizens Against the Refinery's Effects, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, 643
F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1981).
143. Id. at 187.
144. These effects occcur because the air would have been cleaner anyway and no price
which would motivate other reductions was publicly set. In fact, the offset was free to the
new polluter.
145. See Drayton, supra note 2, at 7. Trading is a means to cleaner air while accommo-
dating growth. The primary goal is the attainment of a healthful standard of air quality. See
Hoffman, supra note 9, at 5-7.
146. See Drayton, supra note 2, at 7.
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the trade. Further, the trade has a negative effect on incentives.
Like a plant closing, this reduction provided disincentive for tech-
nological innovation. A disincentive results when offsets are al-
lowed for plant closings and changes to less expensive processes
because the offsets produced are likely to undercut the desired
market price. The price is not based on equivalent technological
prevention costs. There is little incentive for reduction at least cost
because no actual reduction costs are represented in the price. A
private supplier of such an offset would receive an "offset. wind-
fall," while undercutting the intended function of controlled
trading.
147
A related issue is the problem of "paper offsets" in which a
reduction is certified on paper without an actual decrease in emis-
sions.1 48 Offsets are required by the policy to be verifiable and en-
forceable.1 49 However, the basis for comparing emissions before
and after' the trade may not represent the trade's actual effect on
ambient air. For example, a proposed offset for a refinery was to be
obtained partly by reducing emissions of local dry cleaners to off-
set hydrocarbon emissions. 50 Monitoring large numbers of rela-
tively small sources raises questions about whether the reductions
are verifiable or enforceable. 51 Proposals for closing small plants
for use as offsets pose another problem. While purchasing and clos-
ing a plant would be verifiable and enforceable, competitors of the
plant might well expand their business in response to less competi-
tion. The resulting increase in their emissions would be uncounted
147. See Raffle, supra note 24, at 16. The health related standards (NAAQS) are re-
quired to be attained by the Act. The offset policy is independent of the reductions required
for NAAQS attainment. To qualify as an offset, reduction must not be necessary for
NAAQS attainment. Accordingly, the reductions used as offsets are not necessary for attain-
ment of NAAQS and other voluntary reductions are similarly "surplus." However, there is
reason to doubt that the SIPs will result in attainment of NAAQS by the deadline. See
Note, The EPA's Bubble Concept After Alabama Power, 32 STAN. L. REv. 943, 972 (1980).
Even if the reductions under the SIPs successfully meet the deadlines, the potential use of
nearly all other reductions as offsets results in clean-up of a health hazard that is slower
than is practical. Further, the use of low priced reductions, regardless of motivation, dilutes
the market function. Even if accommodation were the only goal of the offset policy, a
rebalancing of the goals of economic development and clean-up is necessary.
148. See LIROFF, supra note 40, at 35, 45 (discussion of concept of offsets "on paper").
149. 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3284 (1979). See also Citizens Against the Refinery's Effects,
Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, 643 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1981).
150. See LiRoFF, supra note 40, at 27.
151. In a similar case, a challenge to the enforceability of offsets was raised. [Current
Developments] 10 ENv'T REP. (BNA) 245-46 (June 15, 1979).
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in the trade because EPA does not regulate all minor polluters. 15 2
Ambient air would actually be more polluted as a result.
Paper offsets can also occur where a source has been emitting
less than its full permit amount. 153 For example, a plant may have
reduced emissions without a change in permit. The ambient air
may still be hazardous despite this uncounted reduction. A subse-
quent offset certification would verify an enforceable reduction
from earlier permit levels. The net effect may be an increase in the
hazard because actual emissions have increased. Relying on permit
levels, or even modeling of major polluters, is dubious because of
the uncertain causal link between major polluters and ambient air
quality.1"
The problems of measurement and causal effect associated
with monitoring reductions at all the varying sources may not be
easily resolved.155 The result may be offset trades without actual
reduction in emissions, which are contrary to the goals of the Act
and the emission offset policy. 15e Of course, if paper offsets are an
infrequent occurrence, the effect on health would not be signifi-
cant. However, the long term effect of trade prices that are not
related to equipment costs is to dilute price and technological in-
centives, undercutting the policy purpose. Low prices result from
paper offsets and the fact that reductions qualify as offsets regard-
less of motivation, because these reductions increase the potential
supply of offsets. Inexpensive, readily available offsets may assist
the accommodation of economic development without meeting the
prime goal of net benefit to air quality.
Certainly EPA was aware that accomodation of development
152. See LIROFF, supra note 40, at 42 (a potential polluter could purchase and close
existing companies). EPA is primarily concerned with major sources. See supra notes 21 &
33. The agency seems to combine a "deep pockets" theory with a concern for administrative
efficiency.
153. See Liroff, supra note 40, at 45.
154. Monitoring may not establish the causal link. The ambient air is measured for
attainment, but reductions are specified for only large sources. Enforcement authorities may
not be concerned about trades of "reductions" already made within a permit, because the
reduction is not required by the SIP. The net effect on the ambient air, however, may be an
actual increase in emissions from actual, rather than permitted, levels of emissions prior to
the trade. Id.
155. See Calvo y Gonzalez, supra note 13, at 389.91 (for a review of the monitoring
problem under the offset policy).
156. See the Act, supra note 1; 44 Fed. Reg. 3274 (1979).
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was a priority trade-off with clean air.157 The use of reductions
generated by factors unrelated to clean air was recognized as dilut-
ing the goal of rapid attainment of clean air.15s Further, the 1979
revisions of the offset policy were foreseen as potential loopholes if
there was not careful enforcement of the policy guidelines.15 9 If
broad offset definitions and uncertain measurement allow too
much accommodation of economic development, attainment of the
primary goal may be threatened.16 0
More certainly, these costless, specious reductions inhibit the
development of the intended market incentives. Reductions which
sell below the least costly actual reduction destroy the market pric-
ing function.1 61 Without an equilibrium between the price of mar-
ginal clean-up and marginal permit purchase, the effect will be the
loss of the benefits of incentive-based regulation.6 2 However, con-
ditioning offset credit on the motivation for a reduction poses un-
acceptable problems in the determination of motive and the com-
plexity of regulations. Strict controls on offset banking and trading
may be the only alternative to failure of the incentive policy exper-
iment. Banking could be restricted to reductions resulting from
changes in abatement technology, or those that are monitored, or
those that have an expiration date. The solution must allow clear
and simple determination of eligibility of reductions for offset
credit. Increased complexity of regulations of offsets would only
discourage reductions by causing delays and greater uncertainty.
3. Local enforcement, federal theory. EPA formulated the
theoretical policy of offsets and banking, and established standards
and conditions. However, as is typical of the conditional grant sys-
157. See 41 Fed. Reg. 53,661, 55,524 (1976). See also Drayton, supra note 5, at 44.
158. 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3280 (1979).
159. Drayton, supra note 5, at 46. As of the summer of 1982, there were indications
that recent expansions of the policy concept were perceived as creating loopholes. While
related policies were challenged in court as inconsistent with the Clean Air Act, the "give-
away" of pollution rights was criticized by noted policy analysts who suggested that the
initial rights should be auctioned by government. Ackerman & Elliot, Air Pollution 'Rights',
N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1982, at 23, cols. 2-5.
160. EPA relies on phased reductions through SIPs to attain NAAQS. Too much ac-
commodation in allowing questionable reductions, however, threatens NAAQS attainment,
because both monitoring accuracy and the causal link between the phased reductions by the
major sources and the ambient air are uncertain. See supra notes 154-55.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 68-88.
162. Pareto optimality will be achieved at a price only insignificantly above the use of
air-no purchase of equipment (prevention) will be stimulated. See supra note 59.
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tern of federal regulation,163 administration of the banks and envi-
sioned markets in offsets is a local government responsibility.'
4
Trades must be approved at both the state and federal levels.1"
EPA's policy statement is not specific as to how the banking
mechanics might operate."6 EPA hoped localities would experi-
ment with a variety of models to test the concept.1 67 In essence,
EPA formulated controlled trading as an incentive regulatory app-
proach and mandated experimental implementation by state and
local government.168
State and local government may cooperatively monitor and
approve trades as well as measure compliance with reduction man-
dates required to meet NAAQS. However, local government has
particular interest in the policy's theoretical advantages for local
economic development. 169 Local priorities differ from those of
EPA. Economic development, especially in stagnant regions, is a
more immediate priority of local government than the long range
effort to meet federal air quality standards.17 0 The national eco-
nomic slowdown, especially in the Northeast, has made local em-
ployment and corporate tax base top political priorities of local
government. The accommodation of development as an objective
of the emission offset policy appears consistent with local concerns.
The market concept, based on a brokerage-type banking system as
envisioned with the 1979 revision of the offset policy, does not
163. States can lose federal highway and sewage construction funds and be subjected to
stringent environmental regulation if the deadline is not met. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(5)
(Supp. IV 1980). See also supra note 21.
164. See, e.g., infra note 265. Under the Act, SIPs must incorporate a permissive provi-
sion allowing banking. See supra note 49. Each region may initiate a banking structure. See
infra note 167.
165. 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3285 (1979) (SIP revision required). Both state and federal ap-
proval is necessary for a trade. EPA is considering allowing states to give final approval to
routine trades under a "generic" rule, similar to the "generic" bubble policy being experi-
mented with in New Jersey.
166. 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3280, 3285 (1979).
167. See Banking Manual, supra note 93; Kurtzweg, supra note 43.
168. Some commentators view mandatory state enforcement of federal programs as co-
ercive use of state resources for federal priorities. See, e.g., Beam, Washington's Regulation
of States and Localities: Origins and Issues, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSPECTIVES (A.C.I.R.
ed. 1981); Kaden, Federalism in the Courts: Agenda for the 1980's, 1981 A.C.I.R. CONF. ON
THE FUTURE OF FEDERALISM IN AMERICA 89-108.
169. Local economic priorities will likely lead to local involvement in at least accommo-
dating development with offsets.
See LIROFF, supra note 40, at 43-44.
170. AQTAD Interviews, supra note 98; Liroff, supra note 40, at 35.
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match a local priority.
Local government officials may view the administration of con-
trolled trading as an added cost, with only theoretical long-term
benefit.17 ' The policy is theoretical, complex, and an unfamiliar ap-
proach to regulation.17 2 A banking operation requires a technical
capacity to process complex data in developing and monitoring
controlled trading.173 Further, local government is unlikely to have
officials with the expertise to develop and manage "futures" mar-
kets in offset trading.17 4 EPA only broadly defined the legal re-
quirements of banking.175 A local bank is not likely to be large
enough, or have sufficient priority, to justify new personnel to de-
velop the necessary rules and procedures. 7 6 In addition, coopera-
tion among various agencies and levels of local government may be
necessary for banking, which compounds the problem of theoreti-
cal comprehension.17 7 Conflicting priorities exist at each level, com-
plicating intergovernmental relations.7 8
The scale of the pollution problem also detracts from effective
local government regulation. Major polluters are likely to be large
industries with plants in various AQCRs. EPA may negotiate di-
rectly with the polluter's home office regarding compliance with
Clean Air Act requirements. 79 The size of the corporate polluter
also affects local government's capacity to act freely. Industry may
have a bargaining power superior to that of local government in air
171. AQTAD Interviews, supra note 98. See also Alexander, supra note 127, at 250
(buyers and sellers find policy too complex).
172. The usual approach to regulation is command and control. This regulation is inno-
vative and, thus, unfamiliar. See id. See also Drayton, supra note 2, at 6; Schultze, supra
note 2, at 44.
173. AQTAD recognized this need by funding data processing capacity and a computer
"librarian." See AQTAD Proposal, supra note 93.
174. Local officials are certainly competent. Few, however, would likely have training or
experience related to offset banking, "future" market structures, or even incentive-based
regulations.
175. 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3280, 3285 (1979).
176. AQTAD Interviews, supra note 98.
177. E.g., AQTAD for Buffalo and Erie County, New York involved cooperation be-
tween various agencies of both the county and the city as well as the state environmental
agency, the local industrial development agency, the regional planning board, and, of course,
local industry. Data had to be shared and coordination developed in spite of differing priori-
ties. AQTAD Interviews, supra note 98.
178. Id.
179. Until a challenge of EPA and SIP mandated reductions is resolved, a source may
not qualify a reduction for offset credit. Reductions qualifying as offsets may not include




These mixed priorities and corporate influences may also re-
sult in difficulties of another sort. Under the policy, local govern-
ment may be a source of reductions for offsets."81 As administrator
of a bank, local government may be both the monitor and a party
to a trade. Local priorities may make local government a willing
supplier. A potential new pollution source is also a new source of
employment and an addition to the tax base. Further, existing
sources seeking expansion or subject to a mandated reduction may
seek offsets using governmental emission reductions. 8 2 Local gov-
ernment could be subject to pressure to supply or locate reductions
to attract or hold local industry. Along with tax incentives, ser-
vices, and development bonds, offset credits have become part of
the competition to attract industry .18-
As an offset supplier, local government could be giving away a
significant resource without full awareness of its value. As a market
develops, the offsets could be of increasing value.18 4 Allocation of
public reductions should be made with consideration of maximiz-
ing the return on government's limited potential reductions.105
Government should also consider leasing or holding a reversionary
right in the offset. For example, providing an offset for a marginal,
existing industry could be of short run value. An unconditional off-
set grant would enable the recipient to sell the offset credit if the
plant was later forced to close by decreasing profits. 18 Local gov-
ernment should allocate available offsets wisely and retain a legal
interest when supplying reductions as offsets.
-Offsets supplied by local government may undercut the devel-
opment of the offset market which is desired as a means to cleaner
air. As with reductions from plant closings, government supplied
180. See Liroff, supra note 40, at 25-26, 43.
181. 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3285 (1979).
182. EPA would allow an existing source, subject to SIP mandated reductions, to meet
the requirements by purchasing an offset. Levin conversation, supra note 17.
183. LIROFF, supra note 40, at 25-26, 31, 31 n. 61.
184. The value of offsets would rise as a market developed. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 73-75..
185. Commentators have suggested allocation with criteria such as impact on tax base,
additional employment, marginal productivity of the industry, new rather than existing in-
dustry, and long term viability. See, e.g., Increment Allocation, supra note 8, at 945. An-
other commentator suggested an auction rather than a "give-away." Ackerman & Elliot, Air-
Pollution 'Rights', N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1982, at 23, cols. 2-5.
186. See Liroff, supra note 40, at 46-47.
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offsets are not given a price by the functioning of market equilib-
rium.11 An offset supplied by government likely will have no pub-
licly recognized price.188 Government supplied offsets contribute to
the oversupply of offsets, undercut prices, and reduce incentives
for innovative technology. Government is also unlikely to be the
least cost reducer. 8" Government supplied or induced offsets di-
lute the incentive-based policy's effectiveness. 90
A further concern is raised by the requirement that a reduc-
tion must be enforceable.191 Local or state government can agree to
verifiably reduce emissions by changing technology, decreasing pol-
luting processes, or eliminating pollution sources. 192 For example,
Virginia promised to reduce the use of pollution-emitting asphalt
to offset a refinery's emissions.0 3 However, doctrine implies that
legislative prerogative cannot be contracted away. 94 Some agree-
ments between government supplier and EPA may arguably bind
future legislative power. 5 Therefore, the enforceability of such re-
ductions is uncertain.
A basic policy question is raised by government's role as a sup-
plier of offsets. In non-attainment regions, the Act's goal is to rem-
edy a health hazard. 96 The offset policy is an accommodation of
priorities for continued economic development. 97 Incentive-based
policy is a means to promote clean-up while allowing economic de-
velopment. 98 Government supplied offsets promote development,
but also allow an industry to substitute its emissions for those of
187. Id. at 25-26.
188. Government could be seen as "purchasing employment," but no recognized price is
present. The offset, in effect, is free and even undercuts the LCR's costs.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79.
190. Local or state government may not supply a reduction. Government units, how-
ever, may induce another source to provide a "free" offset. See LIROFF, supra note 40, at 30-
31.
191. 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3284 (1979).
192. See Citizens Against the Refinery's Effects, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency,
643 F. 2d 183 (4th Cir. 1981).
193. Id.
194. 10 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 29.07 (3d ed. 1981).
195. In Pennsylvania, a reduction of petroleum-based asphalt, occurring because emul-
sion-based asphalt was less expensive, was used by a state agency to provide Volkswagen
with an offset for its U.S. plant. A state agency thereby effectively bound counties and the
state to use a particular paving process. LIROFF, supra note 40, at 20.
196. See the Act, supra note 1.
197. See Drayton, supra note 5, at 44. See also Raffle, supra note 24.
198. See Drayton, supra note 5, at 38, 44.
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government. Government supplied offsets seem anomalous to its
duty of protecting the public. Government makes a priority trade-
off of the public's health for development when it acts as an offset
supplier. If government can change its practices to reduce a health
hazard, perhaps it should do so without allowing another source to
pollute in its place.199
Under the Act, an expansion of the role of state and local gov-
ernment is possible. The 1977 amendments included a provision al-
lowing states to implement a growth margin device.2 00 EPA is con-
sidering another device termed a "revolving fund. '201 These
devices further involve local and state government-politically
more responsive to economic development-in allocation and deci-
sions of eligibility of offsets. The responsiveness of local govern-
ment to economic development may lead to a conflict in priorities
between competing for new industry and managing air quality
policy.
202
A more fundamental difficulty is that the federally developed
theory may be too complex to be practically administered on a lo-
cal level.2 0 3 Local and state government are now expected to imple-
ment the policy with their own resources.20' Initiation of a federal
regulatory program is painless when enforcement costs are paid by
others. Similarly, a new federal approach may be easier to theorize
when implementation is by local government.205 EPA has recog-
199. Government-supplied offsets also undermine the incentive system and their supply
is, to some extent, affected by industry pressure on government. See LiROFF, supra note 40,
at 25-35.
200. See supra note 46.
201. See supra text accompanying note 109.
202. See LIROFF, supra note 40, at 25-26, 30-31, 31 n.61, 43. State and local govern-
ments generally compete for industrial development. Air quality should not become part of
the competition, with each locality trying to give away greater rights to pollute. National
standards and administration are the best method to prevent this practice.
203. AQTAD personnel spent months analyzing the policy, only to conclude that a mar-
ket was too theoretical to be practical. AQTAD Interviews, supra note 98. See also Alexan-
der, supra note 129, at 250 (too theoretical); Tucker, Current Developments, 11 ENv'T REP.
(BNA) 2041 (Feb. 22, 1980) (no one uses it). AQTAD, however, has found merit in the case-
by-case trading of offsets. Government and industrial development agency cooperation pro-
vides a helpful referral service for potential traders. AQTAD Interviews, supra note 98.
204. Although, even when federal funds were provided through AQTAD, the policy was
still rejected as impractical. Id.
205. See Beam, supra note 68; Kaden, supra note 68.
Advocates of local autonomy argue that mandated state and local enforcement of federal
priorities harms local government's integrity and our federal system. Local enforcement may
also hinder the federal program due to reliance on local administrations which have differ-
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nized the difficulty of implementation and is developing more spe-
cific guidelines and assistance in setting up banks. °8 However, lo-
cal government may not be unable to afford or be interested in
expensive administration of federal programs.207 Already accom-
modating mixed priorities on the federal level, the policy is subject
to further dilution by the addition of local priorities in the enforce-
ment process.2°8
Economies of scale may also suggest the impracticality of bank
operations in 247 AQCRs. Bank and market operations could be
federally administered on regional levels.2 09 Local government
could then assist industrial development agencies, utilizing their
expertise in facilitating industrial relocation without a potential
conflict of interest. The policy of emission offsets and banking is
based on an unfamiliar and complex theory.210 Reliance on local
and state government implementation may preclude effectiveness
of the benefits of incentive regulation.
In summary, effectiveness of the offset and banking policy has
been hampered by regional economic conditions, insufficient con-
trol of offset supply, and problems of intergovernmental relations.
The policy has been successful in accommodating development in
case by case trading. The use of performance standards rather
than compliance specification has been an attractive feature, but
does not require a banking system. Markets may evolve as trading
experience increases the value of offsets. However, adjustments in
the implementation of the policy are necessary to avoid accommo-
dating economic and political priorities to the detriment of the
ent priorities than the federal government.
206. See Controlled Trader, supra note 50; Update, supra note 41.
207. Banking operations are optional, so local government may decide not to implement
the policy. 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3280 (1979).
208. The policy already was an accommodation of economic development and pollution
control on the federal level. Intergovernmental relations problems include differing priori-
ties, mistrust, varying levels of expertise, and political responsiveness to different popula-
tions. See National Commission on Air Quality, To Breathe Clean Air (Mar. 1981) See also
M. LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY (1980) (for a discussion of the inherent complica-
tions in enforcement "on the street level").
209. Polluters, under such a program, could still trade offsets within each region, but
would have the advantages of national comparison pricing along with publicity of trades and
price. Also, economies of scale should result in lower administrative cost per trade.
210. Confusing jargon like "offsets," "laer," "ACQRs," "NAAQS," and "paper offsets"
further complicates the complex economic theory behind emission offsets and offset
banking.
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goals of regulation.211
C. Efficiency: Administrative Cost-Effectiveness
21 2
Advocates of the emission offset policy argue that the adminis-
tration of an incentive-based policy is more efficient than tradi-
tional regulation.1 3 The traditional regulatory structure is criti-
cized for specifying the means of compliance and requirements for
each source. 21 4 The emission offset policy gives local managers flex-
ibility in reduction decisions. Under the policy, managers in indus-
try may identify the least costly means of reducing pollution and
trade off higher cost reductions for less expensive curtailments.21
This process may reduce administrative costs by eliminating some
information costs and decreasing industry's tendency to legally
challenge reduction requirements. Information regarding feasibility
and cost of reductions at various sources is costly to gather.21 6 Ad-
ministrative costs can be reduced by utilizing the most cost-effec-
tive sources of information. 217 By giving local managers incentives
211. See Drayton, supra note 5, at 46 (controls would be loopholes).
212. "Efficiency," as a policy analysis term, includes the costs of administration of a
policy. A cost effectiveness measure might best serve to measure the net benefit of each
regulatory method. Comparative benefits, however, are nearly impossible to measure accu-
rately. See Calvo y Gonzalez, supra note 13, at 392. It is possible, however, to compare the
theoretical advantages of the offset policy with the actual practice. Advocates claim that
incentive-based regulation should be more efficient. The LCR concept is an economic effi-
ciency argument. LCR refers to the cost to a polluter of the reduction, not to governmental
administration. Identifying and monitoring LCRs are administrative efficiency concerns. Ac-
cordingly, economic efficiency, a policy goal and the concept behind LCR, is examined in the
section on "effectiveness." See supra text accompanying notes 114-35.
213. Information costs and the costs of determining which source should reduce emis-
sions are shifted to polluters, reducing costs directly as well as indirectly through reducing
the incentive for litigation. See, e.g., Drayton, supra note 5, at 38; Schultze, supra note 2, at
56.
214. SIPs set specified reductions for each source in non-attainment areas. See Dray-
ton, supra note 5, at 38. See also Schultze, supra note 2, at 56; Tucker, supra note 2, at 34.
215. In addition to offsetting new sources, trades might also serve to show attainment
of SIP-required reductions and to "net out" the review requirements for new sources by
offsetting emissions until the new source is below the review threshold. The reductions, in
theory, will come from LCRs due to monetary incentives.
216. See, e.g., Calvo y Gonzalez, supra note 13, at 388.
217. Under traditional regulation, decisions as to where and how to reduce have been
made by regulatory authorities. Industry has had little incentive to provide data on emis-
sions and especially potential reductions, because possible reductions often become required
regardless of cost. Under the emission offset policy, industry is motivated to determine how
LCRs can be made and to demonstrate these reductions to the regulatory authority. See
Drayton, supra note 5, at 38; Schultze, supra note 2, at 56.
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to determine the LCR, the market in offsets motivates information
gathering by those with the best access to information and control
of the polluting processes. 218 Shifting the burden of identifying
LCRs to industry should in theory result in less litigation of reduc-
tion requirements.21 9 The costs of litigating compared to reducing
will not be favorable, even where a polluter previously would liti-
gate only for delay. The polluter is in the position of proving what
can be done.220 Command and control strategies could possibly be
modified to identify and require reductions by the LCR. However,
industry control over processes, proximity, and availability of com-
parative information on alternatives should enable information
gathering to be less costly for industry than government.2 ' Also,
the belief that government is inherently less efficient than profit-
motivated companies supports the argument that the policy has an
efficiency advantage over command and control regulation.
Savings in the initial determination of potential reductions
could be outweighed by monitoring and verification costs. If the
LCRs are previously unmonitored sources, or use technology neces-
sitating new monitoring practices, government costs will in-
crease. 222 Determinations of the effectiveness of new technology
and monitoring numerous small sources for compliance may be ex-
pensive for state and local government.223 Industry incentives to
produce data may decrease information costs of monitoring. De-
creased litigation and less negotiation delay, also as a result of in-
centives, may produce savings outweighing some increased moni-
218. Providing incentives shifts the burden of gathering data and demonstrating possi-
ble reductions to industry. Also, under the traditional regulation, any new technology that
produced a reduction often became required for all applications. Accordingly, industry had
no incentive to develop new equipment. Id.; Drayton, supra note 5, at 38.
219. Schultze, supra note 2, at 56.
220. Litigation over required reductions may be intended to delay reductions. Industry
may also resent interference and be willing to litigate mandated reductions. Flexible re-
quirements are less costly and less fault-based. Industry has less reason to delay. LCRs, in
fact, may have incentive to rapidly certify voluntary reductions. Id.
221. Command and control might require reductions at the least costly source. Industry
could expect cost savings, but administrative costs to the government would be prohibitive.
See BAUMEL & OATES, supra note 60, at 240-42. Allowing states to give final approval may
further reduce EPA's costs. See Levin conversation, supra note 17. A one-step approval
process is less expensive under both this policy and traditional regulation.
222. External trades have not become numerous enough to reliably judge the effect.
Internal trades are usually already monitored so cost does not increase as greatly as is ex-
pected for external trades. See Calvo y Gonzalez, supra note 13, at 389-91.
223. State and local governments perform the monitoring under the SIPs.
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toring costs. If the numbers or types of potential reductions which
qualify for offsets are strictly limited, costs of monitoring may be
reasonable.224 In any case, the political advantage of using LCRs
will be significant because businesses can reduce emissions at lower
cost.225 A fundamental fact emerges: all of the savings depend on
incentives which result from an active market.
The willingness of industry to assume the burden of determin-
ing LCRs is a function of price incentives.226 Price level will be set
by active trading of limited offsets. Where demand for offsets is
weak, a bank is not viable and active trading is unlikely.227 Indus-
try would have greater costs in locating and coordinating an offset
trade in regions without a bank.22 Of course, local government is
likely to take on some of the costs in order to promote develop-
ment.229 In a region operating a case-by-case trading system, the
cost of locating, recording and publicizing offsets will be high.23 °
Active banks motivate industry to assume these costs, and the cost
per trade of bank administration will be lower.231
The development of a bank may be costly. Expertise in offset
banking may be expensive, whether new personnel are added or
current staff re-trained.23 2 Additional data processing capability
will be necessary to record, monitor, and model offsets.2 3 Addi-
tional monitoring equipment and personnel will likely be needed to
verify and enforce reductions.234 Cooperation among various gov-
ernment agencies and industry personnel must be established.23
Yet EPA's desire for experimentation provided local governments
224. See Calvo y Gonzalez, supra note 13, at 389-91.
225. See Tucker, supra note 2, at 34-37 ("wasteful" regulation has antagonized indus-
try; new flexible compliance is advocated by polluters). See also Alexander, supra note 127,
at 235.
226. Hoffman, supra note 9, at 4.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 169-78.
228. Information costs, delay, and the uncertainties of offset availability are all factors
affecting the willingness of an industry to locate in such a region. See Hoffman, supra note
9, at 4-7.
229. E.g., AQTAD Interviews, supra note 98 (a referral system was maintained).
230. A greater portion of the cost falls on government. Moreover, government is less
efficient than industry in gathering the necessary information.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 55 & 209.
232. See AQTAD Proposal, supra note 43.
233. Id.
234. See Calvo y Gonzalez, supra note 13.
235. E.g., meetings, report sharing, training and personal contact.
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little guidance on how a bank should be structured. 236 The policy
and even the "banking manual" provide theoretical explanation
and administrative discretion.3 7 Experimentation is expensive for
local government,28 and even the costs of maintaining a bank may
be prohibitive where demand is low.
23 9
The regulations allow banks to be administered by quasi-pub-
lic or private agencies. 240 For example, a local industrial develop-
ment agency could operate a bank mechanism. However, a "pri-
vately" operated bank would not be able to certify reductions.
Therefore, local government would still bear certification (verifica-
tion) costs, and industrial development would be delayed.241 Local
government would need to cooperate with private banking agencies
on monitoring and referral, thus bearing many of the same costs of
a government operated banking system.
In summary, efficiency considerations could influence EPA's
modifications of the policy. The switch from specification to per-
formance standards will probably increase monitoring costs, 24 2 but
may decrease costs of identifying potential reductions and industry
resistance. Banking administration may be costly to the point of
becoming prohibitive in low demand areas. The benefits of incen-
tives may justify the costs by accommodating economic develop-
ment and promoting LCRs, technology persuading, and voluntary
reductions. However, EPA's expansion of the concept of a private
market in offsets may be costly if attempted without active bank-
ing.24s Various proposals to expand the concept 244 may be impracti-
cal unless designed to activate the banking and marketing of off-
sets. Administrative efficiency is difficult to measure, but the
236. 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3280 (1979). The EPA now provides more information. See
supra note 206.
237. 44 Fed. Reg. 3274 (1979). See also Banking Manual, supra note 93.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 171-77.
239. AQTAD Interviews, supra note 98.
240. See Banking Manual, supra note 93.
241. A government-operated bank certifies reductions upon "deposits." Private banks
cannot certify offsets. The offset would be certified as part of the trade approval at the time
of the trade.
242. See Calvo y Gonzalez, supra note 13.
243. Revolving funds, "netting out" of review, and generic policies may expand moni-
toring which raises costs. Id. The benefits of these expansions may not be significant in
regions without active banking and trading.




emission offset policy may raise costs, especially to local govern-
ment, without the expected benefits. Active, controlled markets are
necessary for benefits to be realized; greater federal control of off-
set supply and federal administration of banking may be the
solution.
D. Equity Distribution of Costs and Benefits2 45
As a policy to accommodate economic development, the emis-
sions offset policy is equitable on its face. Under the policy, new
source construction is allowed in all non-attainment AQCRs.2 "
However, variations in each region's economy, availability of off-
sets, and local governmental administration costs may result in
disparity in actual effect.24 7 For example, under the policy new in-
dustry is allowed in the urban Northeast, but regional economic
conditions preclude the policy's accommodation effect. The policy
requirements, especially where a functioning bank is unlikely, may
be viewed as a major impediment to development.2 48 The original
policy was aimed at accommodating development in traditional in-
dustrialized areas, but may now contribute to greater attractive-
ness of other regions.249
The effect of the offset policy is disadvantageous to economi-
cally stagnant areas, as compared to its effect on prosperous re-
gions. These areas have little offset demand and a viable bank
within the region is therefore impractical.250 Of course, without a
bank, the costs of locating and coordinating an offset are higher
relative to areas with active banking.251 Higher costs and uncer-
tainty of trades may deter industries from locating in regions with-
out active banking. These costs result from administrative ex-
penses of locating and negotiating reductions, not the cost of the
offset itself. Cities without banks may need to induce banks to re-
245. "Equity," as a policy analysis term, refers to the fairness of the distribution of the
costs and benefits among the target populations.
246. 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3284 (1979).
247. See supra text accompanying note 211.
248. Where banking is not viable, industry must locate offsets, coordinate reduction
with construction, and cover the costs of the offset and the delay. See LIROFF, supra note 40,
at 43-44, 60-61.
249. See Davis, supra note 111 (accommodation in urban industrialized areas); Drayton
supra note 5, at 34-36; Liroff, supra note 40, at 43, 60-61.
250. See supra note 98.
251. See supra note 248.
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main competitive in the contest for new development. 52 A bank
induced in a region with weak demand for offsets, even if success-
ful, will be more costly for local government. These costs are espe-
cially inequitable because the greater burden falls on the local gov-
ernments which can least afford them-"-in economically stagnant
areas.2 53 Under these conditions, the policy adds new disincentives
for locating in the Northeast. A federally administered bank sys-
tem would be more cost effective, spread the cost burden more
widely, and equalize the impact of administrative costs on location
decisions.254
On the other hand, an equity problem is raised by disparate
costs and benefits resulting from trades. The trade of hydrocarbon
emissions in Virginia illustrates an example of cost incurred by one
area for the benefit of another..2 5 The asphalt process was con-
verted in the southern and western parts of the state in a trade for
new construction on the east coast.258 In effect, some regions paid
the conversion cost in higher taxes and lost a potential offset for
future economic development in their region.257 Another example
is the exposure of a particular plant's "neighbors" to new or con-
tinued pollution while a plant across town reduces significantly
more than is required by the SIP.2
58
Other equity issues involve disparate impacts on private firms.
In a practical sense, large firms bear the burden of emission reduc-
tion in AQCRs, and the offset policy adds to the burden. 25 Firms
readily able to reduce emissions, even for' reasons unrelated to the
Act, may reap "offset windfalls. 26 0 Offsets supplied to private
252. See Liroff supra note 40, at 43-44, 60-61.
253. A disincentive to growth in the urban industrialized areas adds to an already high
unemployment rate among the poor. See H.R. REP, No. 1175, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 178
(1976). Governments in stagnating areas generally must:meef high welfare, unemployment,
and other service costs, while suffering from an erodiga.x base..
254. See supra text accompanying notes 208-10.
255. See Citizens Against the Refinery's Effects, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency,
643 F.2d 183 (4th Cir.1981).
256. Id.
257. Local benefits of the refinery include jobs, increased tax base, and stimulation to
related industries.
258. See Alexander, supra note 127, at 250.
259. The Act regulates large sources and the policy applies only to major new sources.
See supra note 33.
260. In other words, an unexpected return from a plant closing or other action that
reduces emissions is qualification for an offset credit. See Raffle, supra note 24, at 16.
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firms by government may raise questions about special treatment,
especially where government has no systematic allocation plan.2 1
The purchasing and closing of small firms by large firms seeking to
use the resulting emission reductions seems inequitable and unde-
sirable in view of the goal to accommodate needed economic devel-
opment. 82 The result may be an equivalent level of production or
employment at added cost.
A variety of inequities exist in the distribution of the costs
and benefits of the emission offset policy. These disparities result
from overly broad eligibility of reductions, impracticality of local
government administration of banking, and regional economic con-
ditions. The problems are not necessarily inherent in an incentive
policy. Narrowed eligibility requirements for offsets and federal or
regional banking could resolve the difficulties.
E. Summary
The policy's effectiveness depends on the development of ac-
tive markets by local government.263 However, bank administration
is too costly for the few trades expected in economically declining
regions. Another problem is that local officials are more responsive
to the political benefits of promoting economic development than
to federal priorities. As a result, emission reductions of questiona-
ble benefit to market operations may be credited as offsets. The
administrative efficiency of the policy is also questionable because
enforcement costs may increase. Further, shifting the determina-
tions of least cost reducer to local industry has not resulted in the
expected savings. The equitable distribution of benefits and costs
of the policy depends on adjusting it to regional conditions and
modifying the trading controls. Generally, varying economic condi-
tions and reliance on local government for implementation of fed-
eral policy appear to severely undercut the current policy.
261. See Increment Allocation, supra note 8, at 945; Liroff, supra note 40, at 20.
262. See id. at 42. The Act arguably recognized that some marginal firms would close as
a result of control requirements. However, the goal of economic development may not be
best served by substituting a large firm for many small ones.
263. Local governments are expected to operate the banks. See AQTAD Proposal,




EPA's emission offset and banking policy is accomplishing
many of its goals. However, as a model of incentive-based regula-
tion, the policy has not proven its effectiveness, efficiency, and eq-
uity. Where the effects of the policy have not equaled expectations,
the causes of the failures may be resolvable by changes in imple-
mentation. Local government is very effective in promoting local
development and should play a role in accommodating economic
growth. However, local government can act most effectively as an
advocate of growth, not as a party to trades and administrator of
the trading rules. The administration of the offset requirements
and banking operations are most effective, efficient, and equitable
on a federal or regional level. Federal priorities are diluted by
"street level" enforcement decisions of local and state govern-
ments." 4 Further, the policy is too theoretically complex for prac-
tical delegation to local government. Federal priorities cannot be
realized through an hierarchical structure of regulation when con-
crete programs and consensus on priorities are lacking. 6 5
The conditions which qualify a reduction to be used as an off-
set are too broad. These conditions may be loopholes which enable
an over-supply of reductions to undercut the price incentive mech-
anism. It is important to consider that the underlying goal is to
contribute to eliminating a health hazard. Development is to be
accommodated while contributing to clean-up. This accommoda-
tion process may be utilized to provide monetary incentives for ef-
fective and efficient emission reduction. The means of providing
accommodation and incentives is controlled trading. If imple-
mented with appropriate controls, the incentive regulation scheme
may still accomplish its objectives of accommodating development
and stimulating technological innovation, cost-effective emission
control, and voluntary emission control.
RONALD J. MENDRICK
264. See Lipsky, supra note 208.
265. See Beam, supra note 168, at 7-10, 12.
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